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Abstract—Consider an OFDM based, multi-hop underwater
acoustic sensor network with M + 1 underwater sensing nodes
that report their sensed data to a sink node (on water sur-
face). A malicious node Eve attempts to eavesdrop the ongoing
communication between a sensor node and the sink node. To
this end, this work performs joint optimal node selection for
data forwarding and sub-carrier power allocation (across OFDM
sub-carriers) to maximize the secrecy capacity on each hop.
Specifically, the optimization problem formulated is a mixed
binary-integer program, which is solved via dual decomposition
method. Since this is the first work on secure routing, we compare
the performance of the proposed scheme with the classical depth-
based routing (DBR) scheme in simulations. The simulation
results show that: i) the proposed scheme outperforms the DBR
scheme (i.e., the performance gap between the two schemes
increases) with increase in the transmit power budget of the
sensor nodes, ii) the proposed scheme benefits from the increase
in the density of sensor nodes (while the DBR scheme fails in
such situation).
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication between underwater acoustic sensor net-
works (UWASN) nodes is susceptible to various attacks–
including passive attacks (such as eavesdropping) as well as
active attacks (such as impersonation)–due to the broadcast na-
ture of the acoustic medium [1]. Traditionally, communication
systems have been secured via cryptographic measures (e.g.,
RSA, AES) which provide security at the higher layers of the
protocol stack. But such measures are fallible as demonstrated
by researchers in recent times who have managed to break
into the crypto-based security measures employed by the IEEE
802.11/Wi-Fi systems [2].
The limitations of the cryptography based security measures
have motivated the researchers to focus on the alternate
approach of physical layer security (PLS)—an information-
theoretic approach whose foundations were laid down by
Shannon in his landmark paper [3]. Later, in an influential
work [4], Wyner introduced the wiretap-channel, and defined
secrecy capacity as the maximum achievable secure rate
(secret bits/sec) between two legal nodes, in the presence of
an eavesdropper. Since then, secrecy capacity maximization
has become a de-facto metric to evaluate the performance of
communication systems facing an eavesdropping attack.
This work considers the problem of data forwarding/routing
from a sensor node to the sink node when a (passive) malicious
node Eve is present in the close vicinity. Eve listens to ongoing
communication between a sensor node and the sink node,
thereby potentially decoding confidential information fully or
partially. The shortest data forwarding path from a sensor node
to the sink node may still consist of multiple hops; therefore,
the communication on each hop needs to be protected from
passive attack by Eve.
This work does joint optimal node selection for data for-
warding/routing and power allocation across the orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) sub-carriers at each
hop such that the secrecy capacity at each hop is maximized.
The optimization problem at hand turns out to be a mixed bi-
nary integer programming problem, which is known to be non-
convex and NP-hard. Therefore, we resort to a sub-optimal-
dual decomposition method based approach. However, we note
that the duality gap of the proposed dual decomposition based
solution approaches zero as the number of OFDM sub-carriers
grows large [5].
A. Related work
The recent surge of interest in multi-hop UWASNs has led
the researchers to design a plethora of routing/data forwarding
protocols, each with a different design objective, to address the
unique set of challenges that UWASNs pose (see the survey
article [6] and the references therein for more details). There
are few works on secure routing in UWASNs though [7], [8],
which design routing protocols to detect a wormhole link in
an UWASN. Zhang et. al. [7] detect a wormhole link through
a set of neighbor discovery protocols based on the direction
of arrival (DoA) of the acoustic wave. A secure, anonymous
routing protocol is presented in [8] which does two-way
signature-based authentication under some assumptions (e.g.,
attack node has no information about the location, ID etc.
of the legitimate nodes). However, while the works [7], [8]
deal with wormhole attack through crypto-based measures, this
work counters a passive eavesdropping attack through PLS.
From a different perspective, there are few more works
that deal with the passive eavesdropping attacks in single-
hop UWASNs [9], [10]. The work [9] considers a 2-D region
(a disk) comprising multiple UWASN nodes (and one Eve
node) distributed according to a Poisson point process. The
authors then consider a critical region around Eve to compute
the probability that the eavesdropper is able to intercept
the communication ongoing within the network. Huang et.
al. [10] consider a situation where a node (Alice) transmits
to another node (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper
node (Eve); authors propose that the Bob node exploits the
block transmissions nature and large propagation delays of the
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2Fig. 1: The system model.
acoustic channel to send out a jamming signal which interferes
with the Alice’s signal received at Eve, thus maximizing the
secrecy capacity of the acoustic channel.
Nevertheless, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is
the first work which addresses the problem of secure routing
(i.e., maximizing the secrecy capacity at each hop) in a multi-
hop UWASN, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
Outline. Section II presents the system model. Section III
proposes a novel secure routing method that performs joint
optimal node selection and power allocation (across OFDM
sub-carriers) to maximize the secrecy capacity on each hop.
Section IV provides simulation results. Section V concludes
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an UWASN comprising M + 1 underwater
sensor nodes (so-called Alice nodes) that report their sensed
data (via OFDM scheme with N sub-carriers) to a sink node S
on the water surface (see Fig. 1). Let A = {A0, A1, ..., AM}
represent the set of Alice nodes. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the node A0 has to report its sensed data to
S. Let Di represent the depth of the node Ai from the water
surface, while di represents the distance of node Ai from A0.
We assume that a passive eavesdropper (Eve) is present in the
close vicinity of the UWASN. We further assume that the Eve
is not very closely located to the sink node1.
III. JOINT OPTIMAL SUB-CARRIER POWER ALLOCATION
& DATA FORWARDING NODE SELECTION FOR SECRECY
CAPACITY MAXIMIZATION
We consider a situation where the direct link between A0
and S does not exist. Therefore, the problem at hand is to
design a routing protocol to route the data of A0 to S, while
protecting the data (at each hop) as much as possible from
the eavesdropping attack by Eve. To this end, we propose that
A0 should forward its data to that relay node Ai ∈ C (C =
A∪S | A0) whose secrecy capacity (SC) is maximum among
1This assumption is needed for the proposed secure routing algorithm (to
be described in the next section) to terminate. This assumption is reasonable
because the sink node is typically a very powerful node equipped with
proximity sensors (and thus, is capable of detecting a malicious node nearby).
all other candidate helper nodes. The SC of Ai (summed over
all the N OFDM sub-carriers) is defined as follows:
SC(i) =
( N∑
j=1
log2(1 + SNR
(i)
j )− log2(1 + SNR(E)j )
)+
(1)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0); SNR(i)j (SNR
(E)
j ) is the signal to
noise ratio (SNR) on j-th sub-carrier at Ai (Eve). In plain
words, SC(i) is the channel capacity of Ai less the channel
capacity of Eve.
The SNR on the j-th sub-carrier at Ai is:
SNR
(i)
j =
pj
(
∫
Bj(f)
PL(i)(d, f)df)(
∫
Bj(f)
N(f)df)
(2)
Similarly, the SNR on the j-th sub-carrier at Eve is:
SNR
(E)
j =
pj
(
∫
Bj(f)
PL(E)(d, f)df)(
∫
Bj(f)
N(f)df)
(3)
where pj is the transmit power over j-th sub-carrier; Bj(f)
is the bandwidth of the j-th sub-carrier. PL(d, f) is the
frequency-dependent path-loss between a transmit and receive
pair with separation d, given (in dB scale) as [11]:
PL(d, f)dB = ν10 log d+ dα(f)dB (4)
where ν is the so-called spreading factor, while α(f) is the
coefficient of absorption, given as [11]:
α(f)dB =
0.11f2
1 + f2
+
44f2
4100 + f2
+ 2.75× 10−4f2 + 0.003
(5)
N(f) is the frequency-dependent power spectral density (PSD)
of the ambient noise (comprising of noise contributions from
turbulence, shipping, waves, and thermal noise) [11]:
N(f)dB ≈ N1 − τ10 log f (6)
where N1 and τ are the experimental constants. Note that the
above approximation of the PSD N(f) of ambient noise holds
for frequency range 1− 100 kHz only [11].
To select one such node for data forwarding whose secrecy
capacity is maximum among all other candidate helper nodes,
A0 formulates the following optimization problem:
max
({ηi}i∈C,{pj}Nj=1)
∑
i∈C
ηiSC
(i)({pj}Nj=1) (7)
s.t.
∑
i∈C
ηi
N∑
j=1
pj ≤ PT∑
i∈C
ηi = 1
where ηi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ C; ηi = 1 (ηi = 0) implies that the
helper node Ai is selected (not selected). The first constraint
of the optimization problem in Eq. (7) ensures that for any
candidate helper node Ai, the total power allocated over the
N sub-carriers should not exceed the total power budget PT
of the sensor node A0. The second constraint ensures that only
one node is selected for data forwarding at each hop.
3The optimization program in Eq. (7) is a mixed binary-
integer program; we use dual decomposition approach to solve
it. Regardless of convexity of the original problem, the duality
gap between primal solution and dual solution is nearly zero
provided that the number of OFDM sub-carriers is sufficiently
large [5]. The dual problem is formulated as:
min
λ
D(λ) (8)
where D(λ) is the dual function, and λ > 0 is the dual
variable/Lagrangian multiplier. The dual function is given as:
D(λ) = max
({ηi}i∈C,{pj}Nj=1)
L({ηi}i∈C , {pj}Nj=1, λ) (9)
s.t.
∑
i∈C
ηi = 1
where L(.) is the Lagrangian function, given as:
L =
∑
i∈C
N∑
j=1
ηi
(
log2
(
Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j + pjΩ
(E)
j
Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j + pjΩ
(i)
j
)
+ λPT − λpj
)
where Ω(i)j =
∫
Bj(f)
PL(i)(d, f)df.
∫
Bj(f)
N(f)df , and
Ω
(E)
j =
∫
Bj(f)
PL(E)(d, f)df.
∫
Bj(f)
N(f)df ; Ω(i)j (Ω
(E)
j ) is
the net noise power observed by Ai (Eve). The expression in
the argument of log2(.) above is obtained through logarithmic
property, i.e., log a− log b = log(ab ).
Now, for any selected helper node Ai, Eq. (9) becomes:
max
{pj}Nj=1
N∑
j=1
(
log2
(
Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j + pjΩ
(E)
j
Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j + pjΩ
(i)
j
)
+ λPT − λpj
)
(10)
Eq. (10) is a standard convex optimization program. Let
{p∗j}Nj=1 (derived in the Appendix) be the solution of Eq. (10).
By putting {p∗j}Nj=1 back into Eq. (9), we are left with the
following problem:
D(λ) = max
({ηi}i∈C)
L({ηi}i∈C , {p∗j}Nj=1, λ) (11)
s.t
∑
i∈C
ηi = 1
Let i∗ = arg max
i
L ({ηi}i∈C) ∀i ∈ C, then the optimal
solution to Eq. (11) is:
η∗i =
{
1, i∗ = i & Di < D0
0 else
(12)
where Di is the depth of node Ai. By plugging
{η∗i }i∈C , {p∗j}Nj=1 back into Eq. (9), we are left with the
problem in Eq. (8). To this end, we use the sub-gradient
method, which iteratively solves Eq. (8) according to the
following control law:
λ(m+ 1) = λ(m) + δ(Palloc(m)− PT ) (13)
where δ is the step size, and Palloc(m) =∑
i∈C
∑N
j=1 ηi(m)pj(m). The algorithm converges when
Palloc(m) = PT .
The proposed method (when run on the first hop) is fully
summarized in Algorithm 1. The Algorithm 1 is repeatedly
invoked at each helper node to select the node for the next
hop until the data reaches the sink node.
Algorithm 1: The proposed method for secure routing
Input : di, Di ∀i, dE
Output : p∗j ∀j, η∗i ∀i
Parameters: λ(0), δ, PT ,M,N
1 Optimization:
2 while (1) do
3 repeat
4 implement Eq. (14) ∀j ;
5 implement Eq. (13) ;
6 until Palloc = PT ∀i;
7 end
8 return p∗j ,∀j ;
9 implement Eq. (12) to return η∗i ;
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
The simulations were performed in MATLAB. We used the
specification of a commercial OFDM modem (AM-D2000)
by Aquasent [12] for simulation. Specifically, we assume an
OFDM system with N = 1024 sub-carriers which span a
bandwidth of 6 KHz (from 9-15 kHz). We deploy M + 1
number of legal nodes, and an Eve node according to a uniform
distribution in a (vertical) square region of area 5000 ∗ 5000
m2, under the water. We set ν = 1.5, N1 = 50 dB, τ = 18
dB in Eqs. (4), (6) [11]. We assume that each sensor node
knows the distance of Eve from itself.2 The secrecy capacity
SC plotted in each of the following figures is the minimum
secrecy capacity among all the hops (after a routing path
has been computed by the Algorithm 1). In other words,
SC = min{SC1, ...,SCk, ...,SCK} where SCk is the secrecy
capacity obtained by solving the optimization program in Eq.
(7) at k-th hop (assuming that there are K hops in total.
Furthermore, in all the results below, the benchmark used to
assess the performance of Algorithm 1 is the classical depth-
based routing (DBR) protocol [14]. Briefly speaking, for a
sender node with data, the DBR protocol selects at each hop
a relay node for data forwarding that has maximum depth
among all the candidate helper nodes with depth greater than
the depth of the sender node.
B. Simulation Results
Fig. 2 studies the impact of transmit power budget on
secrecy capacity achieved for the proposed secure routing
scheme and the benchmark under the scenarios of equal
and optimal sub-carrier power allocation. For Fig. 2, we set
M + 1 = 10. We make the following observations: i) the se-
crecy capacity is a piece-wise linear/monotonically-increasing
function of the total power budget PT ; ii) the proposed
2This assumption is inline with the previous works which perform secrecy
capacity analysis of the underwater/terrestrial communication systems [13],
[10]. One example scenario where such assumption holds is the case where
we have our network as well as an outsider node (potentially from some
other nearby UWASN). Such situations frequently arise in shared regions,
e.g., in international waters. In such situation, the system administrator could
manually feed this info to the sensor nodes.
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Fig. 2: The impact of transmit power budget of the sender
nodes on the secrecy capacity.
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Fig. 3: The impact of density of the sensor nodes on the
secrecy capacity.
secure routing scheme (no matter the sub-carriers are loaded
with equal powers, or, with optimal powers) outperforms the
classical DBR scheme (for PT > 120 dBµ Pascals), with
a margin that grows with increase in the transmit power
budget; iii) the performance loss of the strategy of equal power
allocation across the sub-carriers in comparison to the optimal
power allocation strategy is very minimal (for both schemes,
the proposed scheme and the DBR scheme).
Fig. 3 investigates how secrecy capacity behaves as the
density of legitimate UWASN nodes is increased. For Fig. 3,
we set PT = 110 dBµ Pascals. We learn that an increase in the
density of legitimate nodes results in an increase in the secrecy
capacity for our proposed scheme, and zero secrecy capacity
for the DBR scheme. The reason for zero secrecy capacity for
the DBR scheme is as follows: as the node density increases,
it becomes very likely that the DBR scheme selects a node
very close to Eve (at some hop) along the routing path which
culminates in zero secrecy capacity.
V. CONCLUSION
This work studied (for the first time) the eavesdropping
attack on an OFDM-based, multi-hop UWASN. We performed
joint optimal node selection for data forwarding and power
allocation (across the OFDM sub-carriers) to maximize the
secrecy capacity at each hop. The proposed scheme outper-
forms the DBR scheme as the transmit power budget of the
sensor nodes is increased beyond 120 dBµ Pa. Finally, the
proposed scheme benefits from the increase in the density of
sensor nodes (while the DBR scheme fails in such situation).
VI. APPENDIX
The Lagrangian associated with Eq. (7) is:
∆ =
N∑
j=1
(
log2
(
Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j + pjΩ
(E)
j
Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j + pjΩ
(i)
j
)
+ λPT − λpj + µjpj
)
where µj is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with pj . Now,
applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) stationary conditions,
i.e., ∂∆∂pj = 0, we obtain:
µj = λ−
(
Ω
(i)
j Ω
2(E)
j − Ω2(i)j Ω(E)j
)
/ ln(2)(
(Ω
(i)
j Ω
2(E)
j + Ω
(i)
j Ω
2(E)
j pj + Ω
2(i)
j Ω
(E)
j pj + Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j p
2
j
)
Next, we apply KKT complementary slackness condition, i.e.,
µjpj = 0. Then, for any pj > 0 we have:
λ =
(
Ω
(i)
j Ω
2(E)
j − Ω2(i)j Ω(E)j
)
/ ln(2)(
(Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j )
2 + Ω
(i)
j Ω
2(E)
j pj + Ω
2(i)
j Ω
(E)
j pj + Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j p
2
j
)
This leads to the following solution:
p∗j =
−bj +
√
b2j − 4ajcj
2aj
+ (14)
where aj = Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j , bj = Ω
2(i)
j Ω
(E)
j + Ω
(i)
j Ω
2(E)
j
and cj = (Ω
(i)
j Ω
(E)
j )
2 − Ω
(i)
j Ω
2(E)
j
λ ln(2) +
Ω
2(i)
j Ω
(E)
j
λ ln(2) .
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